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of the Turkish academy and NGO community. At the workshop, several scenarios detailing 
how the Kurdish question in Turkey might evolve over the next 10-15 years were discussed. 
The article draws on those discussions to present and analyze a series of scenarios on the 
Kurdish question in Turkey. A scenario analysis is used because the basic premise of this 
article is that the outcome of the four-way interaction between Turkey, the Kurds in Turkey, 
the EU, and Northern Iraq remains fundamentally uncertain, and therefore that describing a 
single future that will emerge is not possible. Instead, given this uncertainty, the key question 
to ask is what potential scenarios are awaiting Turkey and how and why these scenarios might 
emerge in response to moves by the state, and developments within the EU, Northern Iraq, 
and the Kurdish community. Exploring such options can provide a more thorough and 
nuanced understanding of Turkey’s place in the region and opportunities for the 
transformation of the Kurdish conflict. 
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Introduction 
 
“In a democratic Turkey in the process of becoming a European Union member, Kurds see a 
way out. At the same time, the formation of a federal Kurdish region there [in Iraq] is making 
them proud.” 
- Ahmet Türk, co-president of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) 
(Milliyet 2005). 
 
 
 The above quotation from the co-president of the newly founded pro-Kurdish party, 
which replaced DEHAP,1 and is known to be close to PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan - 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party), not only represents how many Kurds see the current political 
situation, but perhaps also illustrates why many fear the future of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. 
The quotation indicates that the future of one of Turkey’s most intractable conflicts is still 
uncertain and evolving. At the same time, it emphasizes that in the years to come, these two 
external developments - Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership process and 
developments in Northern Iraq - will be among the primary drivers that shape the relationship 
between Turks and Kurds in Turkey.  
In an attempt to better understand this complex set of relationships, the authors 
organized a workshop in October 2005, in Sofia Bulgaria, for prominent members of the 
Turkish academy and NGO community. At the workshop, several scenarios detailing how the 
Kurdish question in Turkey might evolve over the next 10-15 years were discussed.2 This 
article draws on those discussions to present and analyze a series of scenarios on the Kurdish 
question in Turkey. These scenarios emerge out of the interaction of the two key driving 
factors that the participants argued would determine the future of the Kurdish question in 
Turkey. Interestingly, these are the same as those identified by Türk: 1) Turkey’s accession 
process with the EU, and, 2) developments within Kurdish-controlled Northern Iraq. 
Thus, it is clear that the Kurdish question in Turkey sits at the nexus of the key 
international issues facing Turkey. It will therefore both affect and be affected by Turkey’s 
geopolitical environment and will contribute to shaping both its foreign and domestic policies. 
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As such, it is a useful window through which to evaluate Turkey’s place in the world in the 
near to medium term. The emergence of this new geopolitical dynamic – one that promises 
potential stability through EU membership and deep uncertainty on Turkey’s southeastern 
border not only offers challenges and opportunities for the transformation of the Kurdish 
conflict, but will also have an important impact on the Middle East, and on the EU - through 
Turkey’s membership, in a good scenario, and as its troubled southeastern neighbor, in a bad 
scenario. 
 
Scenario Analysis 
 
Before moving on to the substantive issues, it is important to understand why a 
scenario analysis methodology is being employed. Pierre Wack, who pioneered the use of 
scenarios as a strategic planning tool at Royal Dutch Shell, describes its purpose in this way: 
“Scenario planning is a discipline for rediscovering the original entrepreneurial power of 
creative foresight in contexts of accelerated change, greater complexity, and genuine 
uncertainty” (Global Business Network 2004).3 In a scenario planning exercise, senior 
managers of a corporation are asked to develop 3-5 scenarios, each of which represents a 
possible future. The scenarios are designed to provide a, “learning environment in which 
managers can explore these forces, better understand the dynamics shaping the future and 
thus, assess strategic options and prepare to take strategic decisions” (IDEA 2004). 
In academia, the methodology of assessing multiple, possible futures or scenarios has 
gone by different names. In an important recent article, Gideon Sjoberg, Elizabeth Gill, and 
Leonard Cain (Sjoberg et al., hereafter), use the term “countersystem analysis” to describe 
social research that relies on the analysis of multiple, potential futures (2003). Each of these 
futures represents an alternative, social arrangement that may emerge. The basic premise of 
countersystem analysis, and the reason for such an analysis, according to the authors, is that 
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there is a greater contingency between present and future than positivist social science 
assumes.4
Such contingency, from the perspective of countersystem analysis, renders a linear 
methodology, in which data on the past are used to predict the future, suspect. Instead, 
countersystem analysis employs a circular movement from the present to the future and back. 
It uses the “empirical present,” what is, as the basis for the description of several possible 
futures. These futures are then analyzed to critically assess presently existing institutions, 
social practices, and so on. 
Proponents of countersystem analysis use the contingency argument to defend the 
methodology on empirical grounds. Specifically, they claim that countersystem analysis 
provides a method, which remains empirical, but allows the analyst to cope with the 
contingent relationship between the present and the future. Sjoberg et al., for instance, argue 
that countersystem analysis is necessary to understand the emergence of new, large-scale 
institutions, such as the EU or the World Trade Organization, neither of which is, “the mere 
extension of what was” (Sjoberg, Gill, and Cain 2003). 
We employ a scenario analysis in this article because our fundamental premise is that 
the outcome of the four-way interaction between Turkey, the Kurds in Turkey, the EU, and 
Northern Iraq remains fundamentally uncertain, and therefore that describing a single future 
that will emerge is not possible. Instead, we argue that given this uncertainty, the key question 
to ask is what potential scenarios are awaiting Turkey and how and why these scenarios might 
emerge in response to moves by the state, and developments within the EU, Northern Iraq and 
the Kurdish community in Turkey. Exploring such options, we believe, can provide a more 
thorough and nuanced understanding of Turkey’s place in the region, as well as prepare 
policymakers to, “assess strategic options and prepare to take strategic decisions” (IDEA 
2004). 
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The Scenario Matrix 
 
As noted above, this article seeks to explore Turkey’s geopolitical environment by 
concentrating on the impact of interaction between Turkey, the Kurds in Turkey, the EU and 
Northern Iraq. What is interesting is that the influence of the EU accession process and the 
influence of Northern Iraq are relatively independent of each other. In other words, these two 
developments are simultaneously, but independently affecting the future of Turkey. Therefore, 
we can envision four scenarios as summarized in the table below: 
 
EU ACCESSION PROCESS 
 EU Accession Goes Smoothly EU Accession Goes Poorly 
Weak Scenario 1: 
“Stable Pluralism” 
Scenario 3: 
“The Internal Struggle” 
INFLUENCE 
OF 
NORTHERN 
IRAQ 
Strong Scenario 2: 
“Peaceful Polarization”  
Scenario 4:  
“Competing Nationalisms”  
 
 
When using a scenario methodology, a key question to ask is “what are the key 
certainties?” In other words, “what do we know that we know?” This allows one to identify 
scenarios that are not feasible, and therefore do not need to be analyzed. One certainty 
identified by the participants at the workshop was that there will not be another period of 
silence on the part of the Kurds as there was from the 1940s through the 1960s. The Kurds 
will not acquiesce to the policies of the Turkish state that they deem to be repressive any 
longer. Therefore, scenarios that rely on assimilation or acquiescence of the Kurds, were 
deemed by the participants to be sufficiently unlikely as to not require further analysis. 
Therefore, in each of the scenarios the Kurds are an important actor5. How they react to these 
two developments and to the actions of the Turkish state are crucial to how each scenario will 
unfold. It is for this reason that we describe these scenarios emerging out of a four-way 
interaction (i.e., Turkey, Kurds, EU, Northern Iraq). 
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The Impact of the EU Accession Process 
 
 There was strong consensus among the workshop participants that the EU accession 
process was the single most important factor in determining how the Kurdish question in 
Turkey would evolve over the next 10-15 years. As a result, the workshop participants spent 
most of one day developing two scenarios describing what Turkey would look like in 2020, 
particularly in regard to the Kurdish question, if the EU process goes well and if the EU 
process does not go well. The insights from this discussion will be integrated into the analysis 
of the scenarios below. However, before turning to these future scenarios, it is important to 
provide a brief historical overview of the EU-Turkey relationship. 
In several ways, 1999 marks a turning point in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy. 
Not only was the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, captured, but the EU accepted the 
candidacy of Turkey.6 Both the capture of Öcalan and the new policies the Turkish state 
began to implement in response to the EU demands appear to have lowered the intensity of 
the Kurdish conflict and created new opportunities and efforts to deal with various aspects of 
the issue. Perhaps most significantly, the EU’s approach of resolving conflict through 
“Europeanization” (Çelik and Rumelili 2006) seems to have finally placed the Kurdish 
question on the agenda and ended the widespread denial within Turkey of the existence of the 
conflict. 
More tangibly, after the declaration of its candidacy, Turkey had to undertake certain 
political and economic reforms to begin accession negotiations with the EU.7 In the Turkish 
context, the impact of the EU on the Kurdish question solidified after Turkey’s status was 
elevated from applicant to candidate. Following the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, 
which granted Turkey candidate status as of November 2000, the EU issued an Accession 
Partnership Document (ADP) with a list of issues that Turkey was required to address. Turkey 
adopted its National Programme for Adoption of the Acquis in March 2001, which resulted in 
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the enactment of several new laws and amendments to some others in order to, inter alia, 
“improve Turkey’s human rights and bring the country’s inflation-prone economy up to 
European standards” (Martin, Midgley, and Teitelbaum 2002). 
 As part of harmonizing its laws with European norms, Turkey signed several 
documents against all forms of discrimination, respect for human rights and rule of law8 and 
passed nine separate reform packages.9 During this process, Turkey also gradually removed 
the almost 20-year old emergency rule in thirteen Kurdish-populated provinces in Eastern and 
Southeastern Anatolia.  
The most general conclusion that can be drawn from Turkey’s involvement into 
European integration process within this context is that the Turkish state had begun treating 
the Kurdish question as a “democratization” issue, and even at times as a minority 
representation issue, although the latter term has not been used in official discourse. That is to 
say, in contrast with the treatment of the conflict during earlier periods as merely a 
development problem or a terrorism problem, since 1999, the Turkish political public started 
to talk about linguistic rights, removal of the state of emergency, return to and reconstruction 
of the post-conflict zones, and release of the Kurdish MPs.10 There is widespread agreement 
within the Turkish NGO and academic community that the EU has been the most important 
actor in creating this shift in the way the Turkish state is addressing the conflict. 
It is with this as a backdrop that Turkey officially began accession negotiations with 
the EU on October 3, 2005. This process, which plays a large role in informing the scenarios 
discussed below, will be a long one with a possibility of delays if Turkey falls short of taking 
the required steps or if political dynamics within the EU change.11 For the purposes of the 
analysis below, fewer delays means a “smooth” accession process, more significant delays 
means the accession process is going “poorly”. 
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The Impact of Developments in Northern Iraq  
 
There was also consensus at the workshop that the events in Northern Iraq are having 
an increasingly important impact on the Kurdish question within Turkey. Again, it is 
important to provide a brief historical overview. 
Turkey has always perceived armed Kurdish groups such as Massoud Barzani’s 
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 
Northern Iraq as a threat to its territorial integrity because of the potential spillover effect of 
the formation of a Kurdish political entity in Iraq. Although recognition of the Kurdish region 
in Northern Iraq as an autonomous region goes back to 1974, when the Iraqi government 
established autonomy in the region to pacify a KDP uprising, the region enjoyed virtually 
none of the privileges of autonomy under Saddam Hussein’s regime (Al Marashi  2005a). The 
fears of Turkey grew stronger as the result of the Kurds’ gaining de-facto autonomy under the 
U.S. military’s protection after the 1991 Gulf War. But until the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
which led to the formation of an autonomous Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq, the fear, often 
described as Sevres Paranoia, was not a very dominant force in the Turkish political 
discourse.12  
The American invasion, however, provided legal recognition to both the KDP and 
PUK and provided the PKK with more territory within which to operate.13 Even more 
troubling, from the perspective of the Turkish state, was the approval of the new constitution 
in the October 15, 2005 elections, which established Northern Iraq as a federal “Autonomous 
Kurdish Region” with substantive powers of self-rule and a weak central government, 
(Articles 114 (1) (Al Marashi  2005b). This represented a significant foreign policy failure for 
Turkey whose goal was to prevent any type of federated Kurdish region (Yavuz and Özcan 
2006). Although the Iraqi constitution has been approved, it remains unclear whether the 
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Kurds in Northern Iraq will be satisfied with autonomy or will seek an independent state, 
which has been the long-stated goal of some Kurdish politicians in the region.  
The Turkish fear, of course, is that federalism in Iraq will result in an independent 
Iraqi Kurdish state which would then destabilize the Kurdish population within its own 
borders. In fact, the recent declarations by Barzani and Talabani about their intentions of 
forming a single administration solidify these fears.14 In an interview with al-Jazeera 
television, as a reply to a question about the establishment of a Kurdish state, Barzani states 
that this is a legitimate right but should take place through understanding and dialogue.15
After the December 15 elections, Turkey began to change its stance towards the 
Kurdish political organizations in Northern Iraq. In particular, with Talabani becoming the 
Iraqi President, Turkish state officers began to recognize their legitimate political status. The 
words of the General Hilmi Özkök, the former head of the Turkish military,16 are telling in 
this regard: “Barzani used to be a tribal leader. Now, that’s changed” (Yetkin 2006). As the 
two political figures have gained legitimacy in the eye of the international community –
Talabani becoming the President of the new Iraqi Republic and Barzani becoming the Prime 
Minister of the Iraqi Kurdistan region – Turkish policy has been changing to accept this new 
reality. 
The change of discourse in even the military’s stance towards the issue and the 
willingness to reconsider policies towards Iraq underline the fact that the Turkish state’s 
possible moves in the region, especially those that concern the Kurds in Northern Iraq, will 
affect the outcome of the Kurdish question in Turkey as well.  
 Finally, in analyzing the possible effects of developments in Northern Iraq, it is 
important to note that in addition to ethnic ties, Kurds in Turkey may be drawn to Northern 
Iraq as the result of better economic opportunities. With Northern Iraq becoming an 
autonomous region with the possibility of controlling oil-rich Kirkuk, it may become an 
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attractive place for Kurds from the economically underdeveloped regions in Turkey.17 
Already Kurds from southeast Turkey can get into universities in Northern Iraq free of charge 
and without taking entrance exams. Kurdish businessmen of Turkey have been given 
incentives to establish businesses in Northern Iraq. Finally, through the firms operating in 
Mersin Free Trade Zone, a financial bridge is being established between the Kurds from both 
sides of the border (Bila 2005). The recent initiation of direct flights from Turkey to Northern 
Iraq may further facilitate the establishment of these relationships.  
Thus, for the purposes of the scenario analysis below, Northern Iraq having a strong 
influence will be defined as the emergence of a common identity, a sense of “we”, between 
the Kurds in Northern Iraq and the Kurds in Turkey. While this sense of “we” will rely in part 
on strong political and economic ties, it will also entail the explicit development of Kurdish 
nationalism within Northern Iraq that is inclusive of Kurds in Turkey and that has as its goal 
the establishment of some form of greater Kurdistan. 
Conversely, a sense of “we” among Iraqi Kurds and Turkish Kurds may be weakened 
by the sharply different social and political contexts that they will be contending with over the 
next 10-15 years. The relationship between Azerbaijainis in Iran and Azerbaijanis in 
Azerbaijan provide an interesting illustration of how political borders can create sharply 
distinct communities despite a common ethnic identity. Brenda Shaffer writes, 
 
Many from the Republic of Azerbaijan commented that the Azerbaijanis in Iran were 
too religious and conservative, while many Iranian Azerbaijanis viewed those in 
republic as very “Russified” and as having lost Azerbaijani or Muslim culture (2000). 
 
Similarly, the Basque in Spain and the Basque in France maintain quite separate existences. 
These differences can emerge and be sustained by citizenship policies in the hosting states, by 
differences in economic status that create resistance to secession, and by traditional 
differences in the ethno-cultural identity of the two groups.  
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The Scenarios 
 
In this section, four scenarios are presented based on the matrix above. The 
presentation draws on the insights from the workshop, as well as our own analysis regarding 
the impact of the EU accession process and events in Northern Iraq. 
  
Scenario 1: Stable Pluralism 
The EU process goes well and Northern Iraq has a weak influence on the Kurds in Turkey. 
 
It was interesting that the workshop participants came to the conclusion that if the EU 
process goes well, the key change in Turkish politics will be a largely intangible shift in what 
they described as the “self-confidence” of both the Turkish state and the Kurdish community. 
This is both a cause and an effect of the belief that an EU process which goes well will create 
a stable and safe political environment within Turkey. In other words, there will be faith in the 
political system. The increased self-confidence and faith in political institutions will create an 
environment in which moderation and mutual accommodation are possible.  
The case of Quebec was often discussed at the workshop as an illustration of this 
virtuous circle of moderation and mutual accommodation. Despite the fully-fledged 
nationalist ambitions of some Quebecois, the conflict in Quebec has been successfully 
managed, at least in part due to the legitimacy of Canadian political institutions and the sense 
that the secessionist Quebecois do not represent an existential threat to the Anglo-Canadian 
identity. 
It should be emphasized that the management of these issues in Turkey will not 
exactly follow the Quebec model. The participants in the workshop, for instance, could not 
come to a consensus on the issue of linguistic rights. Although for some participants, such a 
scenario would bring opportunities for multiculturalism that would allow for bilingualism and 
education in one’s mother tongue, for others, a Quebec-style bilingualism was neither 
desirable nor practical in Turkey. 
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In regard to specifics, the workshop participants agreed that among the first policy 
moves would be a review of election procedures, with the possibility that the parliamentary 
threshold be removed, thereby giving the Kurdish-populated regions more representation in 
the parliament. In addition, there would be certain constitutional changes in order to allow 
some form of self-rule in the southeast. For example, participants argued that political changes 
would grant more powers to cities in the southeast. Such changes would obviously mean more 
Kurdish political power especially in the cities where DEHAP, now DTP, normally gains 
more than 50 percent of the vote. 
While at times, the EU has criticized the slow and uneven implementation of the 
reforms that Turkey is undertaking,18 participants argued that as Turkey comes closer to 
joining the EU, the EU will become more deeply involved in ensuring implementation of 
reforms because the Kurdish region in Turkey will represent the southeast border of the EU. 
As a result, the EU will have a strong incentive to create stability in the region. 
Finally, the virtuous circle of moderation would weaken the power of the PKK, 
although it could remain as a less powerful, largely marginalized insurgent group, or as a 
recreated Kurdish-oriented political party seeking to create change through more legitimate 
means. 
As in other conflicts, there would be spoiler elements in the PKK which would resist a 
shift toward more moderate policies, both by Kurdish groups and by the Turkish government, 
the latter of which because they remove the groups’ raison d’etre. However, these groups 
would not be strong enough to derail the shift toward moderation. In this scenario, the Kurds 
in Turkey are relatively isolated from the Kurds in Northern Iraq. As a result, there would be a 
smaller flow of resources from outside Turkey to sustain an insurgent group. This isolation 
would also weaken the ideological resources of the more extreme Kurdish groups by 
undercutting their ability to tap into dreams of a pan-Kurdish movement. In sum, Kurds in this 
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scenario turn west instead of east and become an integrated minority in the new European-
Turkish political environment. 
 
Scenario 2: Peaceful Polarization 
The EU process goes well and Northern Iraq has a strong influence on the Kurds in Turkey. 
 
 As in Scenario 1, the success of the EU process has created a sense of mutual self-
confidence among Turks and Kurds, as well as faith in the stability of the political system. 
And as in Scenario 1, a virtuous circle of moderation emerges as a result. 
 However, in this scenario, Kurds use this opening of political space to turn east 
instead of west and establish closer relations with the Kurds in Northern Iraq. As 
summarized in the statement of Türk quoted above, Northern Iraq is a sense of pride for 
many Kurds in Turkey. As an illustration, workshop participants from Southeast Anatolia 
informed us that Kurds in the region were very excited about developments in Northern Iraq 
and literally cried when they saw Barzani in Kurdish costume on television with President 
Bush in October 2005. 
 However, the Kurds, although they will look east, will not demand secession. The 
faith in the political stability of the Turkish state and the recognition of the Kurdish identity 
within the larger-EU structure will undermine movements for a separate state. 
 The key to this scenario is that because of the self-confidence of the Turkish state 
created by the EU process, this turn to the east by the Kurds will happen without sparking a 
repressive reaction by the Turkish state. As the Turkish state looks west toward Europe, it 
will become less concerned that the Kurds in the southeast continue to look east. As with the 
Quebecois, the actions of the Kurds will no longer be seen as posing an existential threat to 
the Turkish state. 
 Interestingly, one of the workshop participants, representing an NGO from Southeast 
Anatolia, argued that in many cities in western Turkey, this process of polarization has 
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already started, although it has not been entirely peaceful. Because of rising security fears, 
some Kurds are leaving smaller towns or the mixed areas of cities and moving to the 
Kurdish quarters of cities or returning to the southeast. The increase in Turkish 
ultranationalist uprisings following the flag burning event in March 2005 has contributed to 
this trend. Thus, in this scenario, polarization will occur both at a macro-scale as Kurds 
return to the southeast, but also on a smaller scale within cities and towns as Kurds and 
Turks increasingly turn inward toward their own communities. 
 The Russians in Estonia provide an interesting comparison case to understand this 
type of process. As Estonia solidifies relations with Europe, the Russians in Estonia, who 
are concentrated in the east as with the Kurds in Turkey, continue to be largely isolated from 
the rest of the Estonian population, and continue to identify with Russia in the east. In this 
situation, there is little or no violence or threat of violence between the populations. They 
simply lead different lives. As in Estonia, the dynamics created by existing polarization, the 
influence of neighboring regions and the larger EU context, could, in this scenario, combine 
to reduce the interdependence between Turks and Kurds in Turkey. Although intuitively we 
normally associate increasing polarization with increased marginalization and therefore an 
increase in the possibility of violence toward the state, it is this decreased interdependence 
which creates the possibility of a stable, peaceful, yet highly-polarized Turkey.  
  
Scenario 3: The Internal Struggle 
The EU process goes badly and Northern Iraq has a weak influence on the Kurds in Turkey. 
 
The interaction between the EU process and Turkish nationalism is complex. The 
process is already creating somewhat of a nationalist backlash, which may intensify as the 
process goes forward. However, there was consensus at the workshop that the failure of the 
EU process would lead to a reemergence of a more aggressive Turkish nationalism. In 
particular, anger toward the EU would combine with underlying currents of anti-western and 
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anti-imperialist sentiments within Turkey, including the Sevres Paranoia, and would likely 
fuel the emergence of a triumphalist nationalism. This nationalism would exploit the failure 
of a process involving trans-state institutions and universalist values, in order to reestablish 
the state as the centerpoint of Turkish nationalism. 
The failure of the EU process will also remove the hopes of the Kurds for a stable 
Kurdish identity within the larger EU. As is the case in many conflicts, the danger of 
violence will be heightened when there is a disappointment after a period of rising 
expectations. Thus, the PKK, in response to this disappointment as well as the perceived 
threat from the rise of Turkish nationalist, will become more willing to call for violence and 
civil war. 
The workshop participants described this negative action-reaction sequence in stark 
terms. It was argued that without the EU there would be no national project that both Turks 
and Kurds could support. This will lead to an increasing lack of confidence in the ability of 
the two communities to coexist within Turkey. Finally, it was argued that the situation will 
follow a familiar pattern in which the Turkish state is centripetal - a tendency which will 
increase if Turkish nationalism is ascendant - and in which the Kurds in response are 
centrifugal.  
 The key to this scenario, and what distinguishes it from Scenario 4, is the shape that 
this Kurdish centrifugal resistance takes. In this scenario, the Kurds within Turkey have not 
formed a strong national identity with the Kurds outside Turkey. Such a result could 
emerge, for instance, if in response to escalatory moves by the PKK, Iraqi Kurds choose to 
cooperate with Turkey against the PKK, thereby creating a wedge between the two Kurdish 
nationalisms. This is more likely given recent US pressure on the Iraqi Kurds to cooperate 
with Turkey (Turkish Daily News 2006). 
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 Regardless of exact causes, if Kurds in Turkey do not form a strong national identity 
with Kurds outside of a Turkey, their grievances would become less focused on secession or 
irredentism and more focused on issues within Turkey such as language rights, political 
representation, economic status, social justice and so on. In contrast to Scenario 1, in this 
scenario, the Turkish state is less willing to accommodate these demands, thereby escalating 
the conflict. 
 The revolt by Mayan groups in the Chiapas region of Mexico provides a good 
illustration of the pattern of demands we would expect from the Kurds in this scenario. 
While the demands of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) in Chiapas do 
call for certain forms of autonomy, this autonomy is normally at the level of the village or a 
small number of villages. The bulk of their demands center on issues such as education, 
health, economic policies, and electoral reform. 
 Moreover, as with the situation in Chiapas, we expect this scenario to result in an 
ongoing, low-intensity conflict. Such a result emerges out of the interaction between a 
diffuse resistance movement with a wide range of demands and a state that is ideologically 
opposed to accommodation. 
 
Scenario 4: Competing Nationalisms  
The EU process goes badly and Northern Iraq has a strong influence on Kurds in Turkey. 
 
As in Scenario 3, the problems with the EU process create an action-reaction sequence 
in which the centripetal tendencies of the Turkish state clash with the centrifugal tendencies of 
the Kurds. And again, there is an increasing lack of confidence in the ability of Kurds and 
Turks to co-exist within Turkey. 
In this scenario, unlike in Scenario 3, the Kurds have established close political ties 
with Northern Iraq leading to a strong, common Kurdish identity. As a result, the Kurdish 
demands become increasingly irredentist as opposed to focusing on reforms within Turkey. A 
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truly nationalist Kurdish movement emerges with a clear demand for a greater Kurdistan. 
Moreover, the relationship with a relatively prosperous Northern Iraq allows resources to flow 
from there to the Kurds in Turkey to support the insurgency.  
In this bleakest of scenarios, an intractable conflict emerges between two nationalist 
groups that have framed the conflict in largely irreconcilable terms, on one side the demand 
for a unitary Turkey, on the other the demand for a greater Kurdistan which includes Turkish 
territory. At the workshop, the Palestinian case, as well as the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia, were discussed as analogues for this scenario. 
As in these cases, the risk of violence is high. And once violence emerges in the 
context of irreconcilable demands, it creates more violence in a vicious circle. First, the 
intractable nature of the competing demands makes negotiation appear fruitless. Second, the 
past violence makes negotiation seem a betrayal. As a result, arguments for a military solution 
gain primacy on each side of the conflict. In this particular conflict, however, neither side 
could implement a military solution. Kurdish militants would not be powerful enough to 
defeat the Turkish military. The Turkish military would not be able to defeat a determined 
Kurdish resistance that is receiving support and sanctuary from Northern Iraq. 
As with the Palestinian case and the Yugoslav case, the conflict would likely spread 
throughout Turkish society. One dynamic of intractable conflicts is that they destroy any 
middle or neutral ground. Thus, Turks and Kurds throughout Turkey would be forced to 
choose sides in the conflict. This would likely create a much move violent process of 
polarization as the members of each ethnic groups, even those who rarely thought of their 
ethnicity prior to the conflict, are forced to retreat within the borders of their ethnic 
communities. Again, this would happen on a micro-scale within towns and cities and on a 
macro-scale as Kurds return to the Southeast. 
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These dynamics create a scenario in which the resolution of the conflict requires 
determined external intervention (Yugoslavia) or mutual exhaustion sufficient to make 
formerly unpalatable options appear palatable (Palestine?). As these processes of resolution 
are largely determined by the dynamics of the conflict, little can be said at the current time 
regarding how and in what form they might emerge. 
 
Analysis of the Scenarios 
 
Given that the scenario approach relies on the assumption that the future is in many 
ways unknowable, what insights can an analysis of the four scenarios provide regarding the 
Kurdish question and Turkey’s interaction with its neighbors? 
While these scenarios cannot necessarily tell policymakers what should be done, 
they can tell policymakers where they should be paying attention in order to gain insight 
regarding how to develop strategies that would create more peaceful and prosperous 
scenarios for Turkey. In this section, we provide several insights that emerge out of the 
presentation of the scenarios above. Each of the insights is linked to one or more of the 
scenarios. 
 
From Scenario 1:
Policymakers in Turkey and politicians and intellectuals within the Kurdish community 
should be attuned to the beginning of the virtuous circle of moderation given the conditions 
that give rise to Scenario 1. They should be prepared to recognize and respond in kind to 
conciliatory moves. 
 
From Scenario 1:
If the conditions that given rise to Scenario 1 are present, policymakers in Turkey should not 
overreact to potential spoilers within the Kurdish community. Although those spoilers will be 
highly visible, they are not likely to be powerful, and can be easily marginalized. 
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From Scenario 2:
Policymakers in Turkey should be sensitive to the fact that the EU changes and complicates 
the nature of identity politics by providing a locus of identity “above” the state. Thus, 
resistance on the part of the Kurds to fully integrate within Turkey in this “peaceful 
polarization” scenario is not necessarily a negative development. Kurds in Turkey may evolve 
toward a complex, multi-layered identity, to which their Kurdish, Turkish, and European 
identities all contribute. 
 
From Scenario 2 and Scenario 4: 
Policymakers in Turkey should be aware of the different kinds of interaction between Kurds 
in Turkey and Kurds in Northern Iraq. Economic interaction, and even various forms of 
cultural interaction, do not equate to the emergence of a threatening pan-Kurdism. 
Overreacting to the more benign forms of interaction through strict border policies or heavy-
handed security measures risk creating a backlash on both sides of the border. This could 
create the very pan-Kurdism that the policies are intended to prevent. 
 
From Scenario 3: 
Turkish policymakers should pay close attention to the nature of the demands arising from the 
Kurdish community, and should resist prejudging Kurdish resistance to policies as inherently 
nationalist. A broad menu of Chiapas-style demands are not as irreconcilable as nationalist 
demands for secession or full regional autonomy if the state is not ideologically opposed to 
accommodation. 
 
From Scenarios 3 and 4: 
Moderate Turkish policymakers should be prepared for the potential Turkish nationalist 
backlash if the EU process goes poorly. An aggressive Turkish nationalism plus the 
“certainty” of Kurdish non-acquiescence to repressive policies is the dynamic that creates the 
dangers in Scenarios 3 and 4.  
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From Scenario 4: 
Turkish policymakers and moderates within the Kurdish community should be sensitive to the 
early dynamics that create Scenario 4. In particular, the framing of the conflict as one of 
competing nationalisms creates the possibility for violence, which then hardens the conflict 
into one of irreconcilable demands. Conflicts involving competing nationalisms, such as those 
in Palestine and Yugoslavia are invariably the most dangerous. And once the frames are set 
and violence has occurred, these conflicts are all but intractable.  
Finally, if we look at the four scenarios collectively, two key insights emerge. First, 
the scenarios provide a framework for future research designed to evaluate what is important 
to the Kurds, the policy choices they might make, and the implications of those choices. 
Will they choose prosperity by creating economic ties with an economically dynamic 
Northern Iraq? Will they choose stability by supporting the EU accession process? Will they 
choose ethnic pride by allying with secessionist or pan-Kurdish elements within Iraq? Will 
they choose citizenship rights by integrating into a democratizing Turkey? Since, as was 
noted above, Kurdish acquiescence will not return, it is crucial to analyze, as opposed to 
prejudging, what is driving the decision-making of the Kurds. 
Second, by looking at all four scenarios, it once again becomes clear that the EU 
accession process is the single most important factor determining how the Kurdish question 
will evolve in Turkey. This point was emphasized time and again by the participants in the 
workshop and can be easily seen by comparing Scenarios 1 and 2, both of which are 
relatively positive outcomes, versus Scenarios 3 and 4, both of which are relatively negative 
outcomes. 
Moreover, it becomes clear that Turkey, the Kurds of Turkey, and the EU all have an 
incentive for the EU process to proceed smoothly. The following statement from Türk, 
illustrates the positive dynamics that such a process can create, “In a democratic Turkey, 
Kurds would not tolerate armed resistance . . . the key to the Kandil Mountains [the area 
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known to be harboring PKK militants in Iraq] is in our hands. It is in Turkey. We have to 
stop this bloodshed” (Milliyet 2005, emphasis added). So in the picture Türk paints, Turkey 
is democratic and stable, the Kurds are committed to ending bloodshed, and the EU has a 
stable southeastern neighbor. 
Conversely, neither Turkey, nor the EU, can afford the Palestinianzation of the 
Kurdish question in Turkey. This means that policymakers in Turkey, the EU as well as 
moderates within the Kurdish community should not only do everything in their power to 
keep the EU process going smoothly, but also that they should be prepared to take actions to 
counter the deleterious effect of delays and problems in the EU accession process if and when 
they arise. Scenarios are possible futures, but they are not destiny, if the EU process runs into 
obstacles, actions can be taken to avoid the negative outcomes in Scenarios 3 and 4. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As mentioned above, when developing scenarios it is important to ask what the key 
certainties are in a given situation. However, when we asked the workshop participants to 
identify certainties regarding Turkish politics over the next 10-15 years, they could come up 
with very few. It appears that uncertainty is a fundamental ingredient in the Turkish policy 
environment, both domestic and international. Given this sort of complexity, namely the 
interaction between three regions (Europe, Turkey, and Iraq), two seminal political 
developments (the EU accession process and Iraqi regime change), and two large, complex 
ethnonational groups (Turks and Kurds), it is impossible to provide hard-and-fast policy 
prescriptions. Instead, this article developed several scenarios in order to illuminate the 
types of dynamics to which policymakers must become attuned. These include positive 
dynamics, such as the virtuous circle of moderation and negative dynamics such as the 
development of a pan-Kurdish nationalism. Our goal was to develop scenarios that shed 
light on Turkey’s emerging geopolitical environment so that policymakers in Turkey, the 
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EU, and within the Kurdish community can better prepare for, accurately identify, and 
respond appropriately to both the positive and negative dynamics in this environment as 
they arise.  
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1 DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi/ Democratic People’s Party) is the successor of HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi 
Partisi/ People’s Democracy Party), which was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1998. HADEP’s 
closure is the fourth in line, which includes HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi/People’s Labor Party), DEP (Demokrasi 
Partisi-Democracy Party) and ÖZDEP (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi-Freedom and Democracy Party). After 
DEHAP closed, most of its members joined the DTP. 
 
2 The workshop was entitled Trajectories of Ethnopolitical Conflict in Turkey. Nine participants from Turkey, 
including Turks (4), Kurds (3), Arabs (1), and Armenians (1) participated in the two-and-half day workshop, 
which was organized by the Center for International Development for Conflict Management at the University of 
Maryland, Sabancı University, and the IRIS Institute, Bulgaria, with support from the Hewlett Foundation. 
Among nine participants, six were academics and three were from NGOs, one of whom was a member of a bar 
association in the Kurdish-majority region of Turkey. Two were members of a think tank working on policy-
related-issues including the Kurdish Question. Six participants were male and three were female. The authors 
would like to thank participants for their invaluable contributions. Although the arguments presented are based in 
part on discussions at the workshop, the authors are solely responsible for the contents of the article. 
 
3 This quotation is taken from the website of the Global Business Network, which is largely responsible for the 
popularization of the scenario planning approach. 
 
4 Niklas Luhmann, for instance, argues that contingency is the “defining attribute of modernity.” See (Luhman 
1998). See also, Patomaki (2001), who defends this premise by drawing on the works of methodological realists, 
such as Roy Bhaskar. 
 
5 We need to emphasize that Kurds are not a homogenous group. Although a majority of Kurds in the Kurdish-
populated cities of the eastern and southeastern Anatolia support the pro-Kurdish parties (e.g. Batman’s mayor 
won the office by getting the 73.6% of the votes, and Diyarbakir’s DEHAP mayor won 58.4% of the votes in the 
last local elections in March 2004. See http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/secim2004/default.aspx), not all Kurds, and 
particularly not those in the west, have similar political affinities. However, it is a fact that the dominant political 
discourse of the Kurds are largely affected and shaped by these parties. 
 
6 Officially, Turkey’s efforts to join the European Community (EC) go back to July 31, 1959 when it applied for 
EEC associate membership immediately after Greece. On September 12, 1963, it signed an Association 
Agreement with the EC, the Ankara Treaty, to become an associate member. Its association was expanded in 
1970, and it applied for full membership on April 14, 1987. Turkey’s application for full membership in the EC 
was turned down in 1989 with the claim that the country was not ready to become a member. Instead the 
Commission suggested the initiation of a customs union, which came to reality on March 6, 1995. Finally, on 
December 11, 1999, the European Council of the EU, in its Helsinki Summit of December 1999, decided to 
include Turkey in its enlargement list by elevating its status from applicant to candidate. On December 13, 2002, 
the Copenhagen European Council Summit left Turkey as the only applicant country with no specific date to 
start the accession negotiations. After a two year delay, during the EU summit held in December 2004, the 
European Council has called on the Commission to present a proposal for a framework for accession 
negotiations. 
 
7 EU conditions for the accession negotiation process (acquis communautarire) to start with candidate states are 
established in the Copenhagen Criteria, adopted in the Copenhagen European Council Meeting of June 1993. 
According to the Copenhagen Criteria, candidate states must fulfill several standards and criteria.These standards 
include: 1) political standards: stable institutions governing democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights; 
2) economic standards: the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive 
pressure; 3) compatibility standards: the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to 
the principles of political, economic and monetary union. See Müftüler-Baç (1998). 
 
8 Among many we can list are the 1969 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, albeit with a reservation to Article 22, the European Agreement Relating to Persons Participating 
in Proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and so on. 
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9 See “Turkey Set for 9th EU Reform Package” (The New Anatolian 2006). 
 
10 On June 16, 1994, the Constitutional court banned the pro-Kurdish DEP. After a long series of court 
proceedings and the eventual abolishment of the State Security Courts, which tried the Kurdish MPs, in June 
2004, the MPs were released. Interestingly, the release came the same day of the first Kurdish-language 
broadcast on a Turkish television channel. European institutions welcomed both of these developments. 
 
11 There have been such delays recently. On November 29, 2006, the Commission recommended suspending 
membership negotiations with Turkey on eight of 35 chapters due to the lack of progress on the Cyprus issue. 
Other possible “stumbling blocks” are “freedom of expression, especially court cases against writers and 
journalists, as well as Kurdish minority rights.” (EurActive.com 2006). 
 
12 Sevres Paranoia refers to fears that there are external powers who are trying to challenge the territorial integrity 
of the Turkish state and implement the provisions of the Sevres Treaty of 1920 signed between the Allied and the 
Associated Powers. Article 62 of the Treaty, in particular, calls for local autonomy for the predominantly 
Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia, and north of the frontier of 
Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia. Even though this treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, signed 
between Turkey and the Allied Powers on July 24, 1923, the fear that Turkey’s borders are under the threat of 
such reconfigurations still exists among many Turkish citizens and officials. Although Sevres Paranoia has 
always been present in Turkey, it waxes and wanes over time. As it has recently, it normally becomes stronger in 
the presence of “external threats”, such as the formation of political entities outside of Turkey that might have 
impact on the minorities within Turkey.  
 
13 According to Yavuz and Özcan the worsening of Turkish-American relations has helped the PKK enhance its 
bases in Iraq [and] attack targets inside Turkey. They also claim that the US has allowed Iraqi Kurds access to 
Iraqi armaments, some of which ended up in PKK hands (Yavuz and Özcan 2006). 
 
14 See articles dated January 7, 2006 at the website of the Kuridish Regional Government in Iraq, www.krg.org. 
 
15 “Kurdish President Barzani interviewed on Kurdish Iraqi issues,” January 9, 2006, www.krg.org. 
 
16 General Özkök was replaced by General Yaşar Büyükanıt on August 28, 2006.  
 
17 According to Murat Yetkin of Radikal, income level in Northern Iraq is US$4000 whereas it is US$400 in 
Southeast Anatolia (Yetkin 2005).  
 
17 See, for instance, Commission of the European Communities (2004). 
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